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only,24 leaving without remedy those whose difficulties have already
arisen.
Courts are better qualified than the legislature to deal with such
"sporadic and transitory circumstances," for rules of law regarding
situations such as this should have a high degree of flexibility not
found in legislative enactment. This desirable flexibility has since been
conclusively taken from the Illinois courts. Immediately after the
O'Callaghan decision, the Illinois legislature passed a law declaring
exculpatory clauses in leases to be absolutely void as against public
policy.25 It is submitted that such a blanket invalidation of a device
which is sometimes desirable is not the answer to this problem. The
answer lies rather in the approach taken by the New Jersey and Dis-
trict of Columbia courts. 26 The facts before the court should be care-
fully scrutinized, and if unequal bargaining power or a public interest
is found to exist, liability should be imposed notwithstanding the ex-
culpatory contract. If these factors are found not to exist, the con-
tractual avoidance of liability should be given effect.
JOSEPH L. LYLE, JR.
DISCRETIONARY JURY TRIAL UNDER
THE FEDERAL RULES
Since 1938 and the merger of law and equity in the federal courts
a number of varied problems have arisen concerning the right to jury
trial in particular situations. One of the more difficult of these prob-
lems appears in cases involving an equitable claim and a legal counter-
claim, when a common issue exists between the claim and counter-
claim.
This perplexing situation is vividly illustrated in the recent case
of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover.1 Fox West Coast Theatres, Inc.
filed a "Complaint for Declaratory Relief" against Beacon in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of California. Fox
operated a movie theatre in San Bernadino, California, and had for
some time been exhibiting films under contracts with distributors
'Statutes in Massachusetts and New York declaring exculpatory clauses in
leases to be void as against public policy have been construed to operate prospec-
tively only. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 186, § 15 (1945), construed in Levins v. Theopold,
326 Mass. 511 , 95 N.E.2d 554 (s95o); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 234, construed in
Weiler v. Drydock Say. Inst., 258 App. Div. 581, 17 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't 1940).
"Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 8o, § 15(a) (1959).
XSee notes 13-16 supra.
1359 U.S. 5oo (959).
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which provided for "clearances" 2 and granted it the exclusive right to
show "first runs"3 in the San Bernadino competitive area. According
to Fox, Beacon built a drive-in theatre eleven miles from San Berna-
dino and notified Fox that it considered Fox's distributor contracts to
be overt acts violative of the anti-trust laws.4 Alleging that this noti-
fication, together with threats of treble damage suits, deprived it of
the valuable property right to negotiate for exclusive first run con-
tarcts, Fox prayed for a declaration that a grant of clearance between
the Fox and Beacon theatres was not in violation of the anti-trust
laws, and for an injunction to prevent Beacon from instituting any
anti-trust action. Beacon filed an answer and a counterclaim against
Fox, putting in issue the allegations of the complaint and asking for
treble damages because of a conspiracy by Fox and its distributors
to restrain trade. Whether competition existed between the two thea-
tres was an issue common to the complaint and counterclaim. On
Beacon's demand for jury trial, the District Court, acting under Rule
4 2(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, directed a trial of the
complaint to the court first, including any and all common issues, be-
fore jury determination of the counterclaim.
Beacon sought a writ of mandamus requiring the district judge
to vacate the orders denying a jury trial, but the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit refused the writ.5 However, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the ground that "'maintenance
of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies
so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming cur-
tailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the ut-
most care.' "6 '
In a five-to-three decision,7 the Supreme Court reversed the decis-
ion of the Court of Appeals and held that Beacon was entitled to a
jury trial. The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Black, stated
that the flexibility of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act resulted in an expansion of legal
remedies necessarily affecting the scope of equity, and that traditional
equity distinctions must be re-examined in light of the remedies
-This refers to the period of time which must elapse between exhibitions of
the same picture within a particular area or by specific theatres.
3This signifies the first exhibition of a motion picture in a given area.
4Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
5Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864 (gth Cir. 1958).
6359 U.S. at 5o, citing Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
7justice Frankfurter took no part in the decision.
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available under the Act and in light of the fact that under the Rules
the same court tries both equitable and legal claims.$
The dissent, written by Mr. Justice Stewart, which began with an
interpretation of Rule 4 2(b), said that there was no right to a jury
trial and that the district judge had permissibly exercised his discretion
in scheduling a trial of an equitable claim before a legal claim. The
minority opinion followed the traditional view that Fox, by alleging
an inadequate remedy at law, irreparable harm, and violation of a
property right, stated a claim originally cognizable in equity and was
therefore entitled to a trial by the court. By citing the equitable
principle that original equity jurisdiction is not destroyel by a sub-
sequently accruing adequate legal remedy, the dissent summarily dis-
posed of Beacon's counterclaim.
While the majority and dissent apparently agree as to the purpose
and effect of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal
Rules, 10 this is the only common ground between the two opinions.
The majority seems reluctant to venture forth without clearcut au-
thority-of which there is a noticeable absence in this field-and there-
fore creates a "strawman" by retreating to the safety of a mystical
discussion involving modernization of the traditional equity distinc-
tions and principles. This discussion only clouds the real issue, and
results in an opinion which cannot be cited as a precedent for a single
fundamental proposition.
If the watchword of the majority is caution, that of the dissent is
custom. The minority reiterates the reasoning of the Cort of Appeals,
adding only an unconstructive criticism of the "strawman" created
by the majority. Although the majority of the Supreme Court reached
a correct and desirable result, there are clearer, more valid, and more
convincing grounds upon which to rest this result.
If the Court had desired to follow the traditional trail, a valid
ground would seem to be that Fox's complaint as a bill in equity would
have been dismissed prior to merger in the federal courts because it
failed to show that Beacon did not intend to pursue its threats of
treble damage suits with a test of its rights in court. In support of this
position, the Court could have looked to a case such as A. B. Farquhar
Co. v. National Harrow Co.," which established that it is not an ac-
tionable wrong when one in good faith makes a complaint to whom-
'359 U.S. at 504-11 (1959).
'Id. at 5 11.
"'Id. at 508-09, 514.
'11o2 Fed. 714 (3 d Cir. 1goo).
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ever he will that it is his purpose to insist upon what he believes to
be his legal rights, even though he may misconceive what those rights
are.12 A strong analogy could have been drawn between the principal
case and the numerous patent cases'3 which have held that a patentee
may notify infringers of its claims and warn them that suits will be
brought to protect its rights if necessary.' 4 Therefore, since prior to
merger equity would not have taken jurisdiction over Fox's complaint,
Beacon could have brought its counterclaim as an action at law and
would have been entitled by right to a jury trial.' 5
Had the Court desired to proceed in a more modern fashion, it
could have utilized the line of reasoning that Fox's complaint for
declaratory relief was flied in anticipation of, and as a substitute for a
defense to, a suit by Beacon for damages under the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act. Thus even though the incipient defendant, Fox, reached
court first by filing suit for declaratory relief, the right to trial by jury
would continue to exist because Fox's suit was in anticipation of a suit
for damages in which Beacon would have had the right to a jury trial.'6
The courts have generally agreed that a prospective defendant,
in an effort to anticipate actions for which a jury would have been
proper, may not employ declaratory judgment as a procedural de-
vice by filing a suit for such relief and then arguing that the action
is essentially an equitable one, thereby destroying the right to trial
by jury.' * The majority would have had little trouble in finding
121d. at 715.
WVirtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. C., i79 Fed. 115 (8th Cir. 19iro); Mitchell v.
International Tailoring Co., i6g Fed. 145 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. igog); Adriance, Platt & Co.,
v. National Harrow Co., 121 Fed. 827- (ad Cir. 19o3); Warren Featherbone Co. v.
Landauer, 151 Fed. io (C.C.E.D. Wis. 19o3); Computing Scale Co. v. National
Computing Scale Co., 79 Fed. 96z (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1897); Kelley v. Ypsilanti Dress-
Stay Mfg. Co., 44 Fed. i9 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 189o); Chase v. Tuttle, 27 Fed. 11o
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1886); Kidd v. Horry, 28 Fed. 773 (C..E.D. Pa. 1886).
"The only limitation to the issuance of such warnings is good faith, which
is shown in the present case by Beacon's filing its counterclaim. Emack v. Kane, 34
Fed. 46 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888). See note ii supra.
"See notes 23 and 24 infra and accompanying text.
16Dickinson v. General Acc. Fire &-Life Assur. Corp., 147 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1945);
Hargrove v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225 (ioth Cir. 1942); Pacific Indem.
v. McDonald, 107 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1939); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Koch,
ioz F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1939); Aetna Cas. 8& Sur. Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321 (4th Cir.
1937).
17Schaefer v. Gunzburg, 246 F.2d ii (9th Cir. 1957); Sanders v. Louisville & N.
Ry., 144 F. 2d 485 (6th Cir. 1944); Hargrove v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225
(ioth Cir. 1942); Great No. Life Ins. Co. v. Vince, ii8 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. x941);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Krejci, 123 F.ad 594 (7th Cir. 1943); Pacific Indem. v. Mc-
Donald, 107 E.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1939); Buromin v. National Aluminate Corp., 70
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authority supporting the right to jury trial in declaratory relief ac-
tions as to those issues in regard to which either party could have
claimed a jury in any action for which the declaratory relief action
may be regarded as a substitute.1 s
Perhaps the strongest and most feasible ground upon which to
rest the majority result-and one the majority comes closest to adopt-
ingl-is that the district judge abused his discretion under Federal
Rule 4 2(b)
20 by ordering a court trial of Fox's so-called "equitable"
claim before jury trial of Beacon's legal counterclaim.
Since the basic nature of Beacon's counterclaim for damages under
the Sherman Act was of a common law right, and was therefore a
claim triable by jury, Beacon was in fact entitled to a jury trial on its
counterclaim.2 ' An extremely close analogy can be drawn to the patent
cases wherein this pattern of raising a legal counterclaim as an af-
firmative answer to a complaint for declaratory relief (including an
injunctive prayer) frequently appears. An illustrative situation appears
in General Motors Corp. v. California Research Corp.,2 2 which was
a suit for a declaration that patents owned by defendant were invalid
and that plaintiff was not infringing such patents, and, as in the prin-
cipal case, for an injunction restraining defendant from suing plaintiff
for any alleged infringement. California Research filed an answer and
a counterclaim, which was a claim for damages, averring the validity of
the patents and alleging infringement by General Motors. As in the
Beacon case, defendant demanded a jury trial and plaintiff moved to
strike the demand. The Federal District Court for the District of
F. Supp. 214 (D. Del. 1947); Bakelite Corp. v. Lubri-Zol Dev. Corp., 34 F. Supp.
142 (D. Del. 194o); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. McIver, 27 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.
Cal. 1939).
16Dickinson v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 147 F.2d 396 (9 th Cir. 1945);
General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Schero, 151 Fad 825 (sth Cir. 1945);
Piedmont Fire Ins. Co. v. Aaron, 138 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1943); Beaunit Mills, Inc. v.
Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.ad 563 (2d Cir. 1942); Williams v. Employers Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 131 F.2d 6oi (5th Cir. 1942); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Timms
& Howard, 1o8 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1939); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sammons, 99 F.2d
323 (5 th Cir. 1938); Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321 (4 th Cir. 1937);
North American Philips Co. v. Brownshield, 9 F.R.D. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. McAuley, 2 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); United States Fid. & Guar. v.
Nauer, 1 F.R.D. 547 (D. Mass. 1941).
"'359 U.S. at 5o8.
n"The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order
a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of
any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-
party claims, or issues." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 2(b).
*"That an action for damages under the Sherman, Act is triable by jury has long
been established. Fleitmann v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
19 F.D.R. 565 (Del. 1949).
i 96o]
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Delaware held that the defendant was entitled to a trial by jury on
the issues raised by the counterclaim, which included the common
issue of infringement.23 Other courts support this result.2 4 It would
seem to follow that Beacon should at least be entitled to a jury trial
upon the issues raised by its legal counterclaim, which would necessar-
ily include the common issue of competition.
Having determined that Beacon's counterclaim was legal, thus es-
tablishing the presence of legal and equitable issues, the court's dis-
cretionary power to try one "claim" before the other under Rule 42(b)
must next be examined. In determining the order and mode of trial
and in exercising discretion under Rule 4 2(b), the substantive rights
of the parties cannot be overlooked.2 5 It would seem that one of the
more important substantive rights to be considered is the constitu-
tionally protected right to trial by jury.20 The Ninth Circuit itself,
in expressing its endorsement of the constitutional guarantee, stated
that "this court is firmly committed to the doctrine that the constitu-
tional right to jury trial should not be eroded by a flow of decisions
giving force to dubious waivers and rationalized construction of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"2T In exercising discretion under
Rule 4 2(b), a court should strive to preserve the Constitution. Thus
when the right to jury trial is involved, the exercise of discretion under
42(b) should be narrowly limited because jury trial is a constitution-
ally guaranteed right whereas the alternative, court trial, is not.28
Moreover, Rule 4 2(b) expressly provides that a court may order
a separate trial "to avoid prejudice," 29 and this phrase is of particular
significance in the Beacon case. Since at least the issue of competition
was common to the omplaint and counterclaim, this provision could
only be complied with, and the substantive right to jury trial could
only be preserved, by requiring the court to try the common law issues
to a jury first.30 Otherwise their determination would be precluded by
the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel. This fact is clearly
OId. at 568.
uOklahoma Contracting Co. v. Magnolia Pipeline Co., 195 F.2d 391 (5th Cir.
1952); Lisle Mills, Inc. v. Arkay Infants Wear, Inc., 9o F. Supp. 676 (E.D.N.Y. 1950);
Ryan Distrib. Corp. v. Caley, Bi F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
25"The exercise of discretion does not permit the court to disregard the sub-
stantive principles of law established for the protection of litigants." Cohen v. Young,
127 F.2d 721, 726 (6th Cir. 1942).
"Bowie v. Sorrell, 2o9 F.2d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1953).
"Schafer v. Gunzburg, 246 F.2d 11, 15 (gth Cir. 1957). (Emphasis added.)
21Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 1536 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Great American Ins. Co.
v. Johnson, 25 F.2d 847, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 629 (1928).
29See note 20 supra.
'OBruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.-2d 730 (gth Cir. 1946).
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illustrated in Sabolsky v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,S1 an
anti-trust suit for an accounting, an injuntion, and treble damages,
in which the legal claim (damages) and the equitable claim (injunc-
tion) involved a common question of fact. The court stated that if it
made "a disposition of the equitable cause of action previous to a
jury trial on the legal cause of action, the common controlling ques-
tion of fact would be foreclosed from jury determination as a matter
of res judicata."3 2
To the same effect is Leimer v. Woods,3 3 where, in a suit for viola-
tions of rent regulations in which plaintiff was seeking an injunction,
restitution, and damages, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri denied a jury trial, and the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. In speaking of the right
to jury trial as set out by Federal Rule 38(a), the court said:
"In the long range, if the right of trial by jury is actually
to be preserved thus inviolate to the parties, its proclamation
in legal letter can only be kept from becoming an artificiality
by the accompaniment of a sympathetic judicial attitude. And
such a hospitable spirit on the part of a court would seem
naturally to suggest that, where joinder has been made of co-
ordinate equitable and legal causes of action and some of such
causes of action, as here, involve a common, controlling issue of
fact, on which there normally is a right to a jury trial as to the
legal cause of action, the question ordinarily should be defer-
enitally allowed to be determined by a jury, rather than for the
court, without some special reason or impelling circumstance
in the situation, to undertake to foreclose it as a matter of res
judicata by designedly proceeding to make a previous disposi-
tion of the equitable cause of action."34
The court, speaking with less equivocation, held that "a federal court
may not under the Rules of Civil Procedure, in a situation of joined
or consolidated equitable and legal causes of action, involving a com-
mon substantial question of fact, deprive either party of a properly
demanded jury trial upon that question by proceeding to a previous
disposition of the equitable cause of action and so causing the fact
to become res judicata.... "3 Thus it can be seen that in order to
"avoid prejudice," when the right to jury trial exists in a case in-
volving a common issue, the court must order a trial by jury of such
3i1 F.R.D. 138 (E.D. Pa. 1952 ) .
"Id. at 140.
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issue first, for otherwise any later jury determination of the issue will
be precluded.
In an interpretation of Rule 4 2(b), reference should be made to the
general intent of the Federal Rules and to specific provisions of other
rules therein. From such reference it can be seen that in many instances
the rules either require or encourage all claims for relief-whether
historically legal or equitable, or whether available as a claim, counter-
claim or cross-claim-to be filed in the same action.3 6 The penalty for
noncompliance is permanent loss of the claim. In the principal case
Beacon's counterclaim qualified under Rule 13(a)3 7 as compulsory, and
consequently Beacon was forced to assert it or lose it forever. That by
being forced to assert its claim Beacon cannot be held to have waived
its right to jury trial is a fact recognized even by the dissent.38 Cer-
tainly the Federal Rules were not intended to undermine one of the
cornerstones of the American judicial system-jury trial-nor to pun-
ish a party for obeying their provisions.3 0
In an action involving issues triable to the court as well as issues
triable by a jury, the order of trial has been shown to be within the
sound discretion of the court. However, it has also been shown that
the exercise of such discretion is dependent upon the promotion of
efficient administration without curtailing the parties' substantive
rights. By first allowing trial to the court of Fox's complaint the Dis-
trict Court may have promoted efficient administration, but it cer-
tainly did not protect Beacon's established right to trial by jury.
Therefore, the failure of the District Court to schedule trial of Beacon's
"Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); 12(b), 13(a), i3(b), 13(g), x8 (h).
'n"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim, any claim ... if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
w'Since Beacon's counterclaim was compulsory under the Rules ... it is apparent
that by filing it Beacon could not be held to have waived its jury rights." 359 U.S. at
519. See Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal Rights and Remedies Under the New Federal
Procedure, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 127, 141 (1948).
"With the above reasoning in mind, the only opportunity for the exercise of
discretion under Rule 42(b) that presents itself is that of joint trial practiced by
some courts where both "legal" and "equitable" issues are present in an action. Mun-
kascy v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 38o (E.D.N.Y. 1942). The usual pro-
cedure is to take "as much evidence as possible before the jury even though it may
relate to both legal and equitable issues, and taking such additional evidence as may
be necessary outside the presence of the jury." 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 894 (1950). From this it will readily be seen that, in the situation
under discussion, a joint trial is procedually impossible as a solution because of the
existence of a common issue. But see 73 Harv. L. Rev. 186, 188-89 (1959). Is the
common issue "legal" or "equitable"? Which will determine the common issue, the
jury or the court?" "[T]he trial judge cannot escape an express ruling on priority of
trial." 2o Tex. L. Rev. 427, 434 (1942).
